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Introduction 
The importance of corporate governance has been globally recognized evident by the 
emergence of international standards and responses to the corporate governance debate from 
all regions of the world. The enactment of new legislation and corporate governance codes and 
regulations in some countries are also indicative of its increasing importance. Examples of 
these responses include the development of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance; 
the Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance (CACG) Guidelines for Corporate 
Governance, and the United States’ Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. These measures were not 
only a response to myriad corporate scandals, but also the result of the appeal from 
international institutional investors who demanded improved corporate governance in 
corporations and countries as a condition to invest. The more recent global financial crisis of 
 
Abstract 
Building on corporate governance research and responsible leadership theory this paper 
examines, through a multiple case approach, three major cases of corporate failures in the 
emerging economies of Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, member states of the 
Caribbean Community trade bloc. The paper accordingly provides valuable insights into the 
dynamics of corporate governance in the Caribbean and proposes a responsible leadership 
approach as a framework to mitigating agency-problems and addressing the changing 
business contexts of the region. The paper suggests that researchers and practitioners need to 
develop a more holistic approach towards understanding corporate governance by going 
beyond traditional governance mechanisms and controls, and incorporating responsible 
leadership levels of analysis into the equation. It also establishes that regulators, boards, 
management, and auditors are critical to avoiding corporate failures and that good corporate 
governance is fundamental to the performance and sustainability of firms and economies as a 
whole. 
2 
 
2008 as a result of the collapse of many banks and financial institutions further propelled 
corporate governance on the agenda of all major economies (Crane & Matten, 2010). 
Understandably, achieving good corporate governance became a central theme in most of the 
governance related discussions and initiatives in these economies. Despite this growing global 
corporate governance movement, the Caribbean region’s response has however been very 
limited notwithstanding its own corporate governance challenges.1  
 
This article therefore examines the major corporate governance crises in three of the major 
member countries of CARICOM − Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, respectively. 
In each of the cases, failure is attributed primarily to poor internal and external corporate 
governance practices and have raised questions concerning the roles of regulators, boards, 
executives, and auditors. The importance of good corporate governance practices for ensuring 
firm performance and sustainability as well as economic stability is also strongly established. 
The paper provides valuable insights into the dynamics of corporate governance in the 
Caribbean and proposes a responsible leadership approach as a framework to mitigating 
agency problems and addressing the changing business contexts of the region. It suggests that 
researchers and practitioners need to develop a more holistic approach towards understanding 
corporate governance by going beyond traditional governance mechanisms and controls, and 
incorporating responsible leadership levels of analysis into the equation. The article is 
organized as follows: the first section gives an overview of corporate governance while the 
second examines the corporate governance landscape of the Caribbean. The third outlines the 
methodological approach employed in the study, and examines the three cases in detail. An 
analysis of the commonalities in these cases together with a proposed approach to achieving 
good governance in the Caribbean is discussed in the fourth section. In general, the paper 
contributes to corporate governance research in emerging markets and applies the theory of 
responsible leadership (RL) within the context of corporate governance. 
 
Overview of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance, at its most basic level, establishes the rules to deal with issues related 
to the separation of ownership and control and so defines the framework in which 
relationships between a company’s management, its board of directors, its shareholders, and 
other stakeholders interact (CIPE, 2008). For shareholders, corporate governance can provide 
increased confidence of an equitable return on their investment; while for stakeholders, it can 
provide an assurance that the organization manages its impact on the environment and 
society in a responsible manner (Maier, 2005). Corporate governance also encompasses the 
combination of laws, regulations, listing rules, and voluntary private sector practices that 
enable the company to attract capital, perform efficiently, generate profit, and meet other 
legal obligations and general societal expectations (Maier, 2005). It is pertinent to note, 
however, that there is no universally- accepted definition of corporate governance. This is 
partly attributable to context specificity, emphasis on different aspects by different 
                                                        
1  “Caribbean” is this article refers to the 15 emerging economies that are part of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
established in 1973 to promote economic integration and cooperation as well as to ensure that the benefits of integration are 
equitably shared. The 15 Member States are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad 
and Tobago. The population of CARICOM is just over 16 million and predominantly English-speaking.  
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professional groups, and theoretical perspectives. Nonetheless, governance is relevant to the 
performance of both private and public sector organizations, and many of the principles and 
concepts of governance are applicable to both sectors (Uhrig, 2003).  
 
It has been established that companies can derive various benefits by practicing good 
corporate governance. A well-governed entity will be more efficient and more likely to produce 
effective outcomes. Good corporate governance improves access to capital and financial 
markets and attracts greater investment as well as it strengthens management by shaping a 
sound company strategy that will generate better profit margins. Empirical research has 
revealed that over 84 percent of global institutional investors are willing to pay a premium for 
the shares of a well-governed company over one with a comparable financial record, but that is 
poorly governed (CIPE, 2005). In addition, good corporate governance minimizes the incidence 
of corruption and improves the management of risks (Tricker, 2012). It also helps prevent 
systemic banking crises even in countries where most firms are not actively traded on stock 
exchanges (CIPE, 2005) as is the case of the Caribbean region. Good corporate governance also 
involves companies taking into serious consideration their environmental and social footprints 
by being responsible corporate citizens (OECD, 2004). 
 
Unlike developed economies where the link between good corporate governance and publicly- 
traded shares are obvious, in emerging markets, such as the Caribbean, there is a tendency to 
overlook its importance. This is largely due to the limited role of the stock market for raising 
capital and the widespread dominance of smaller firms that do not have listed shares in 
addition to large family-owned, state-owned, and/or foreign-owned companies whose shares 
are also not widely traded locally (Oman, Fries, & Buiter, 2003). Yet given the highly 
interconnected economies that exist and the opportunities that emerging markets provide for 
investors, corporate governance in such regions cannot continue to be ignored. Further to 
facilitate a sustained development of these economies, good corporate governance is 
fundamental. 
 
There are a number of principles as well as structural and behavioral factors that are presented 
in the literature as ideals for good corporate governance. The question of what constitutes 
good corporate governance, however, is not as important or as relevant as the question of 
whether or not governance is present and whether it is the most appropriate form for the 
particular entity (Uhrig, 2003). This is why it is easier to identify the lack of governance through 
failure than the presence of sound governance mechanisms and structures through success. 
Good corporate governance, nevertheless, is commonly presented as entailing the following 
characteristics: (a) Shareholders elect directors who represent them; (b) Directors vote on key 
matters and adopt the majority decision; (c) Decisions are made in a transparent manner so 
that shareholders and others can hold directors accountable; (d) The entity adopts accounting 
standards to generate the information necessary for directors, investors, and other 
stakeholders to make decisions; and (e) The organization’s policies and practices adhere to 
applicable local laws (CIPE, 2008).  
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The Corporate Governance Landscape of the Caribbean 
 
As mentioned earlier, the CARICOM community is comprised of 15 emerging economies where 
organized markets are nascent and credible governance structures have historically been 
limited (ECCB, 2003). In each Caribbean state, there are several pieces of legislation designed 
to enforce order, discipline, regulate businesses, protect the public, and enhance transparency, 
disclosure, and accountability to ensure an efficiently functioning economy. But due to the 
individuality of circumstances in each member state, there are disparities within the regulatory 
system ranging from penalties for offences, effectiveness, and interpretation. These disparities 
could make doing business difficult, as well as unintentionally allow inadequate controls for 
regulating a company’s behavior and so pose greater risks to the region’s financial stability 
(CTIR, 2005).  
 
Developments in the area of corporate governance in the Caribbean have been limited to the 
financial sector. These were largely a result of the financial crisis in Latin America, Asia, and 
Russia that led to an increase in global sensitivity to risks in the international financial markets 
(ECCB, 2003). In addition, concerns with respect to money laundering and terrorist financing 
have also triggered pressure for governance related developments in the region. These drove 
Central Banks to improve levels of supervision and regulation of financial institutions and the 
adoption of international standards. Nevertheless, within the non-financial sectors adoption of 
good corporate governance measures has been inadequate. This is because corporate 
governance is generally considered in the context of promoting investor protection, but less 
than one percent of the Caribbean population could be deemed as being an active investor 
(ECCB, 2003:10). Thus corporate governance has not played an important role in regional 
corporations on account of the lack of institutional-and-retail-investor participation (ECCB, 
2003). Moreover, before the CLICO/CFL fiasco of 2009, the Caribbean did not experience the 
types of crises and losses of investors’/depositors’ funds that have occurred in other regions. 
This, in itself, served to retard the pace in which corporate governance has developed in the 
region. 
 
On a whole, as a region, the Caribbean faces some inherent corporate governance problems 
and peculiarities based on the small size of its countries and economies as outlined in Table 2 
below. These peculiarities suggest that a formal governance framework in each of the islands 
is required and that there is a need for an overarching Caribbean response on corporate 
governance issues. The recommended Caribbean Corporate Governance Code in 2003, for 
example, was an appropriate regional response to be implemented through the Caribbean 
Single Market and Economy (CSME), but for various reasons this initiative never materialized 
(CTIR, 2005). However, there is a higher probability that individual national codes will be 
established instead given the launched of governance codes in Jamaica (2006) and Trinidad 
and Tobago (2013). 
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Table 1: Governance Peculiarities and Challenges in the Caribbean2 
 
 
In the current context, it is the banking sector that has the highest supervision while other 
sectors such as insurance, trust business, credit unions, and pensions are still lagging behind. 
This is because commercial banks play a dominant role in the financing of privately-owned 
entities. The supervision of banks, however, has been heavily focused on protecting customer 
deposits rather than shareholders’ funds or with general matters of corporate governance 
(CTIR, 2005). There are nine (9) Central Banks among the fifteen (15) CARICOM member states 
with each having its own governance guidelines that have been used to guide the behavior of 
banks, insurance and other financially related institutions in their respective jurisdictions. 
There are also a number of Security Exchanges across the region − Barbados, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana, and the Eastern Caribbean − with clear listing rules and regulations. 
These governance guidelines and listing rules have all been heavily influenced by international 
developments (CTIR, 2005).  
 
                                                        
2 Source: Derived from an analysis of data from the Caribbean Trade and Investment Report: Corporate Integration & 
Cross-Border Development, 2005 and Report on the Caribbean Corporate Governance Forum, 2003. 
GOVERNANCE 
PECULIARITIES 
GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS / CHALLENGES 
Overreliance on the Same 
Pool to Select Directors 
(Small Director Pool) 
 Widespread Cross-Directorships  
 Concept of the Independent Director is difficult to apply 
 Widespread Conflicts of Interest 
Small Number of Public 
Companies 
 Low volume stock markets 
 Under-resourced SECs (unable to attract and retain highly 
skilled persons) 
 Unsophisticated governance practices 
 Concentrated number of shareholders 
Dominance of Private 
Companies 
 
 Highly unregulated private sector 
 Development of Boards and Directors remain limited 
 Board governance is generally not professionalized  
Dominance of Large 
Family-Owned Firms 
 Little strategic changes overtime 
 Limited number of outside Directors 
 Higher instances of CEO Duality/Executive Chairpersons  
Heavy State Involvement in 
Economic Activities 
 Governance is conformance driven  
 State-Owned Enterprises with politicized Board Members 
Preference for Commercial 
Bank Financing 
 Stock Markets unable to grow/expand 
No Overarching Regional 
Regulator(s) 
 
 No commonality or coordination in time of regional crises  
 Poor monitoring and enforcement of governance related 
requirements 
Weak Legislative 
Frameworks 
 
 Limitation on power/authority of regulators 
 Limited enforcement of laws 
 Loop holes conducive for very risky venture 
Culture of Poor 
Enforcement of Laws 
 Limited consequences for non-compliance 
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Despite the region’s peculiarities and challenges, good corporate governance will provide the 
Caribbean with many benefits that can increase economic stability and sustained 
development. These benefits include enhanced self-regulation of companies, positive societal 
recognition due to a transparent internal governance structure, and a reduction in the supply 
side of corruption (ECCB, 2003). 
 
Methodological Approach 
 
This paper is interested in the causes and consequences of three major cases of financial 
collapse in the Caribbean. It is exploratory in nature and aims not only to provide clarity to the 
dynamics that existed in these cases but also to propel further research in the area. In this 
context, the article seeks to provide in-depth insights as opposed to establish relationships 
between variables. A multiple case study approach was therefore adopted to allow an 
understanding of complex issues and is considered a robust research method, particularly, 
when a holistic, in-depth investigation and explanation of a social phenomenon is required 
(Yin, 2013). Data derived from archival records, secondary literature and desktop research have 
been employed to examine the three cases. Each element assisted in the corroboration of 
information as well as the creation of the case summaries.  
 
Case 1: Trade Confirmers Limited (Barbados)  
 
The first case to be considered is the collapse of Trade Confirmers (Barbados) Limited. 
Information for this case was obtained from the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Causes of the Collapse of Trade Confirmers (Barbados) Ltd, 1988. Trade Confirmers (Barbados) 
Limited (TCBL) was incorporated on March 31, 1982 under the Barbados Companies Act with 
an authorized share capital of $5,000,00. Based on the Memorandum of Association, TCBL 
offered a variety of financial services. These included carrying on the business of financiers, 
discounting trade bills, acting as a confirming house, drawing bills of exchange, granting loans 
to individuals and firms, acquiring shares of other companies and guaranteeing the 
performance of their contracts, and carrying on the business of insurers. After one year of 
operation, TCBL was designated a Financial Institution on April 8, 1983 on recommendation of 
the Central Bank of Barbados. This new status allowed the Central Bank to exercise a measure 
of control over TCBL by conducting periodic inspections of its books and accounts. 
 
TCBL launched a successful advertising and sales campaign boosted by the promise to pay 
above-market interest rates on deposits, particularly, higher than those offered by the 
established commercial banks. By the end of August 1983, TCBL had received deposits to the 
total of US$2.4M. Almost four (4) years later, TCBL went into receivership on October 9, 1987. 
On February 29, 1988, a Commission of Inquiry was appointed to investigate and report on: 
 
1. The causes of the collapse of Trade Confirmers (Barbados) Ltd; 
 
2. Whether the business of Trade Confirmers was carried on negligently or with intent 
to defraud depositors or other creditors, and shareholders, or in any way that was 
unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregarded, their interests; and 
 
3. To make such recommendations as considered appropriate. 
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The Commission found that TCBL was under-capitalized from the beginning of its operations 
and in breach of various financial regulations. The Central Bank inspection in May 1984, one 
year after becoming a financial institution, revealed that the funding of TCBL was provided by 
fixed deposits totaling US$4.3M, share capital amounting to US$973K and Bank barrowings 
amounting to US$2.8M. The excess of deposits to share capital was a concern for the 
regulators as well as the narrow base of the deposits. Nine (9) customers held deposits of 
$100K or more and two (2) had balances of approximately US$800K. This coupled with the fact 
that the majority of deposits (83%) were for periods of two years and less made the deposit 
base very volatile. Withdrawal of either or both of these deposits could have placed the 
institution in a serious liquidity situation. 
 
During this first inspection, it was discovered that loans and advances were at US$8.7M. This 
represented a loan-to-deposit ratio of 204% and clearly indicated that TCBL was severely over- 
lent. The inspectors also found that there was a lack of up-to-date financial information on 
borrowers and that many of them had poor credit ratings at other financial institutions. TCBL 
was also guilty of breaches of the Rate of Interest Act, the Hire Purchase Act, the Exchange 
Control Act, and the stipulations in relation to unsecured loans to directors. In fact, two 
directors had already obtained advances from the company which were unsecured. In 
November 1984, a second inspection was conducted and revealed that very little had changed 
in the operations of TCBL. The number of deposits had decreased from 97 to 91 and 
borrowings from commercial banks had increased by 37%. In addition, approximately 40% of 
the loans portfolio was classified as either “adverse,” “sub-standard,” or “doubtful.” 
 
The incompetence and negligence of the auditors were also prevalent in this case. The Inquiry 
found that both the audit senior and the audit partner had no experience in auditing financial 
institutions. Audit working papers that were reviewed during the commission showed a 
considerable lack of planning and failure to consider issues such as materiality, income 
recognition criteria, and loan loss provision. 
 
The negligence, incompetence, and irresponsible attitude of the Board of Directors and 
management also significantly contributed to TCBL’s collapse. Although the company was in a 
dangerous and risky position, the Board declared and paid a seven percent dividend in 1985 
and 1986. The undercapitalization and the difficulty the company was entering with high-risk 
customers should have prompted a more prudent and responsible decision. The Commission 
of Inquiry eventually concluded that: 
 
 The business of TCBL was carried on by the Directors in a manner that unfairly 
prejudiced and unfairly disregarded the interest of the depositors, shareholders, 
and creditors. 
 
 The Directors were negligent in failing to exercise due care and diligence in the 
management of the company. 
 
 The Chairman and the Managing Director withdrew funds of the company without 
the authority of the Board of Directors. 
 
 The Managing Director caused fictitious entries to be made in the account books of 
the company and that several of these transactions appeared to be fraudulent. 
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 The auditors failed to adhere to generally-accepted auditing standards in the 
acceptance and execution of the audit. 
 
 The Central Bank of Barbados failed to exercise its powers under Section 36 of the 
Central Bank Act, allowing them to place restrictions on Trade Confirmers. 
 
Although the Commission of Inquiry provided its findings to the Director of Public Prosecutors, 
no one has been charged and/or prosecuted to date. 
 
Case 2: The Jamaica Financial Crisis 
 
From the mid-1980s, Jamaica took steps to liberalize its financial sector with a view to creating 
an environment conducive to efficient financial intermediation and the strengthening of the 
Central Bank’s ability to influence money and credit variables (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 2002). By 
1990, the Central Bank had removed the ceilings placed on banking system credit, and 
announced the unification of the cash reserve and liquid assets ratio. Savings rates were also 
totally deregulated, enabling commercial banks to set their own rates. In addition, the foreign 
exchange system was liberalized and the exchange rate subsequently was determined by 
market conditions and the movement of foreign exchange in and out of the country became 
unrestricted (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 2002). 
 
These liberalization policies resulted in significant changes in Jamaica’s financial landscape. 
According to Kirkpatrick and Tennant (2002:1935), the financial sector experienced rapid asset 
expansion with significant operations among commercial banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. The assets of the commercial banks represented 50% of the total assets of the 
financial sector by late 1997. The number of non-bank financial institutions also increased from 
8 in 1985 to 25 in 1993, with assets increasing in nominal terms from US $0.25B in 1986 to US 
0.44B in 1993 (Peart, 1995:15). 
 
In addition to the increased in non-bank financial institutions, there was a significant increase 
in the number of large financial conglomerates during this period. These conglomerates, 
according to Green (1999:4), were created by insurance companies to exploit the financial 
arbitrage provided by the existence of differential cash reserve requirements and differences in 
the level of supervision over the various subsectors of the financial system. Typically, these 
conglomerates were comprised of a merchant bank, a commercial bank, a building society, an 
insurance company, and other firms/subsidiaries. The business models were complex with 
inter-company shareholdings, interlocking boards of directors, common management, and 
extensive inter-group transactions (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 2002). These entities expanded 
aggressively with innovative financial services and failed to maintain the required prudent 
financial practices. However, as a result of the interlocking nature of these conglomerates, 
there was a high risk of contagion, which made the entire sector vulnerable to financial 
instability. Further, the private sector’s allocation of banking system credit rapidly increased 
throughout the period from US$0.53B in 1985 to US$0.84B in 1993 (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 
2002:1936). There was, in fact, an unsustainable credit boom in which loans and investments 
were made without proper risk assessment or appropriately valued collateral.  
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It was, therefore, not surprising that by the mid-1990s, the initial boom of the financial sector 
began to show clear signs of burst. Private sector credit that grew by almost 70% in 1993 
drastically declined to 25% in 1996. The profitability of the sector was also on the decline with 
a reduction in the return on assets of commercial banks. The banking system’s capital base had 
also deteriorated to 3% compared to 8% of the international standard for capital adequacy 
(Green, 1999: 21). In addition, most of the insurance companies were plagued by the mismatch 
of assets and liabilities. In the early 1990s, the life insurance industry entered into the 
aggressive advertising campaigns for short-term and equity-linked products by offering high 
rates of return. Imprudent investment of these short-term savings in long-term assets, mainly 
real estate, resulted in illiquidity problems for the life insurance industry. The illiquidity 
problems in the life insurance industry served as the catalyst for the financial crisis of 1997. The 
illiquidity problems in the life insurance industry that was precipitated by the downturn in the 
real estate and stock markets rapidly spread to affiliated commercial banks that were 
subsequently forced to turn to the Central Bank for liquidity support. In 1995, one commercial 
bank received US$0.11B in liquidity support and in 1996 approximately US$0.16B was given to 
two other banks. As the problems in the sector worsened, depositors withdrew their savings 
from what were perceived to be weak institutions, mainly indigenous with local management, 
and deposited these funds with branches of foreign banks (Green, 1999:24). These events 
culminated in 6 of the then 9 commercial banks which accounted for 60% of the deposits; 5 life 
insurance companies which accounted for 90% of the premium income; one third of all 
merchant banks; and several building societies being insolvent. In order to address the 
escalating problems within the sector, the government established the Financial Sector 
Adjustment Company Limited (FINSAC) in January 1997 to deal with the troubled institutions. 
By the end of 1997, the Government of Jamaica assumed control of a number of failed financial 
institutions, including CNB, Eagle Commercial Bank, Workers Savings and Loan Bank, Island 
Victoria Bank, and Jamaica Citizen Bank (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 2002; Swaby, 2011)).  
 
The Jamaican crisis was arguably induced by financial liberalization that facilitated the 
financial sector’s vulnerability to systemic failure. With the removal of interest rate ceilings and 
credit controls, banks were able to finance risker ventures for higher returns, however, this also 
increases the probability of the occurrence of agency conflicts which may lead to a lower level 
of managerial prudence and hence greater financial fragility (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 2002). In 
the Jamaican case, these tendencies were evident. There was deterioration in the quality of 
loan portfolios as well as high levels of non-performing loans. In addition, there were several 
instances of financial imprudence due to the following: 
 
 Inexperience and inadequate skills for screening and monitoring higher-risk 
lending; 
 
 Agency conflicts between managers/owners and depositors; 
 
 Innovative, but risky attempts to maintain market share; 
 
 Related-party transactions; and 
 
 Managerial overspending. 
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These can be further delineated as follows: (a) the absence of or failure to comply with proper 
internal control procedures, (b) poor risk management and inadequate portfolio 
diversification; (c) poor quality of management and strategic planning, (d) the failure to 
exercise due diligence and care; (e) a high incidence of connected party lending; and (f) breach 
of fiduciary duty and fraud (CTIR, 2005). 
 
Case 3: The CLICO/CLF Meltdown (Trinidad &Tobago) 
 
CLICO was the largest insurance company in the Caribbean, the flagship of its parent 
company, CL Financial (CLF). In turn, CLF was the largest privately-owned conglomerate in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean with operations spanning its core business of insurance, but which 
also included financial services, real estate development, manufacturing, agriculture and 
forestry, retail and distribution, energy, media, and communications (Browne, 2011). CLF 
operated in 32 countries through its associated and joint venture companies, and through 
more than 65 subsidiaries spanning the Caribbean, Florida, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. 
Until 2009, it controlled assets in excess of TT$100B (Soverall, 2012: 167). CLF also owned 55% 
majority ownership of Republic Bank, Trinidad and Tobago’s largest commercial bank, as well 
as Methanol Holdings of Trinidad Ltd., which operated M5000, then the world’s largest 
methanol plant. It also controlled the British American Insurance Company (BA) which is one of 
the main insurance companies in the Eastern Caribbean. In addition, the four largest financial 
institutions in CLF managed assets of over TT$38B which constituted approximately 25% of 
Trinidad and Tobago’s GDP (Soverall, 2012: 167)). 
 
This impressive business portfolio was unfortunately plagued with a flawed business model. 
CLICO was a subsidiary of the parent company, CL Financial. However, CLICO functioned as 
the primary source of deposits that were used to finance CLF’s expansion through investments 
and acquisitions held in the name of other entities in the group (Soverall, 2012). The nature of 
the ownership structure of these enterprises significantly varied. Some were wholly-owned 
and managed by CLF, others were simply investments that CLF did not participate in 
managing, and some were a mixture of both. In some cases, CLF borrowed from other 
subsidiary financial institutions to invest, and in most cases it used CLICO, Clico Investment 
Bank Limited (CIB), British American Insurance Company (BA), or Caribbean Money Market 
Brokers (CMMB) as the conduit to purchase investments or borrowed from them to do so. In 
short, CLICO became the guarantor for many of CLF’s assets most of which were heavily 
pledged and, therefore, limited in terms of the potential proceeds from asset sales.  
 
By operating with such a model, the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT) alleged that 
CLICO operated both an external Ponzi scheme in which the insurance company took in new 
money from policyholders and mutual fund investors, as well as an internal Ponzi scheme in 
which money was diverted or misappropriated away from CLICO to fund CIB, CLF, and other 
group entities with little or no prospect of return (Henry, 2009). In other words, CLICO took 
large numbers of deposits on a short-term basis paying high interest rates and used them for 
long-term investments which resulted in significant cash flow problems that precipitated its 
ultimate collapse.  
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However, the warnings of this collapse emerged years before. A 1998 Report of the Office of 
the Supervisor of Insurances had raised the red flags of the affairs of CLICO. The Report 
indicated that CLICO had failed to satisfy its statutory fund, a basic safeguard used to ensure 
the soundness of insurance companies. The fund recorded a TT$62.4M deficit in 1992, a $1.3M 
deficit in 1993, a $64.7M deficit in 1995, a $574.1M deficit in 1996, and a $690M in 1997 (Bagoo, 
2010). The 1998 Report stated that CLICO was “technically insolvent,” broke the law by paying 
dividends when its statutory fund was in deficit, apparently understated liabilities through the 
failure to submit acceptable actuarial certificates, and was using policyholders’ funds to offer 
guarantees to affiliates. The report further revealed that the lag in the company’s efforts to 
satisfy the statutory fund became a perennial problem. CLICO had also requested the Office of 
the Supervisor of Insurances to approve a debenture for TT$571M from CLF. The Office 
however refused noting the company’s low returns and the lack of free assets to support the 
debenture as well as the company defaulting in 1996/1997 on payment of $4M on an existing 
debenture issued to CLICO in 1992. The 1992 debenture was a result of CLICO’s loan to CLF 
which increased from $350M in 1995 to $571M in 1996 (Bagoo, 2010). The Supervisor of 
Insurances therefore questioned the ability of CLICO to pay an additional sum of $158M per 
annum plus interest on this new debenture.  The Report stated that it was disturbing that 
CLICO had continued to use policyholders’ funds to make unsecured loans to its parent 
company (CFL) that was heavily leveraged and with little capital reserves. Despite this report, 
and therefore the Central Bank’s awareness, no steps were taken to address these glaring 
breaches. 
 
There are always underlying vulnerabilities in the origin of a crisis which may include a 
combination of factors ranging from poor-risk management, mismatches between assets and 
liabilities, excessive leveraging of available capital, poor liquidity management, inadequate 
capital (whether or not capital grows insufficiently as the institution’s liabilities expand), hubris 
among management, and outright fraud. In the case of CLICO/CLF, there were: a mismatch 
between assets and liabilities, excessive leveraging of balance sheet assets, a preponderance 
of intragroup transactions, an absence of an effective risk management framework, and plain 
capital inadequacy (Soverall & Persaud, 2013).  These, in turn, were compounded by a weak 
legislative and regulatory infrastructure in which CLF − the holding company − was not 
subjected to adequate formal regulatory oversight and practiced poor internal governance 
when it did pay attention to such detail (Soverall & Persaud, 2013). These five factors are also 
related to a lack of good governance practices among the boards of directors, executives, 
external auditors, and regulators of CLICO/CFL. The consequences of years of persistent bad 
management and governance within CLICO/CLF together with inaction by regulators were 
eventually manifested in 2009. The global financial crisis of 2008 was simply the catalyst for 
the inevitable meltdown of CLICO/CLF. 
 
The collapse of CLICO/CLF forced the intervention of the Government of the Republic Trinidad 
and Tobago (GORTT) because the financial condition of CLICO, CLICO Investment Bank (CIB), 
and British American Insurance Company (Trinidad) Limited (BA), subsidiaries of the parent 
company, CL Financial, threatened the interest of depositors, policyholders, and creditors of 
these institutions and posed danger of disruption or damage to the financial system of Trinidad 
and Tobago (GORTT, 2009). This intervention was formalized through a Memorandum of 
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Understanding (MOU) between the GORTT and CLF dated January 30, 2009. The overarching 
aim of the MOU was to protect the interest of depositors, policyholders, and creditors of these 
institutions as well as to correct the financial problems of CLICO, CIB, and BA.  
 
In a move towards correcting the financial condition of these companies, CLF agreed to sell all 
its shareholdings in Republic Bank Limited (RBL), Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited 
(MHTL), and Caribbean Money Market Brokers Limited (CMMB). CLF also agreed to the selling 
of all or any of its other assets as may be required to achieve the said correction (MOU, 2009).  
In addition, the proceeds of the sale of assets would be applied to satisfy the statutory fund 
requirements for CLICO and BA under the Insurance Act of 1980 and the balancing of the third-
party assets and liabilities portfolio of CIB. However, in the event that there was a shortfall 
after the application of the proceeds realized from the sale of the assets, CLF warranted to 
provide collateral which could include a secured charge on the fixed and floating assets of CLF, 
CLICO, and BA; this amount was to be sufficient to secure any financial assistance to be 
provided by GORTT in respect of that shortfall for the purpose of maintaining public 
confidence and stability in the financial system (GORTT, 2009). Moreover, according to the 
MOU, CLF agreed that “CLICO and BA will restructure its business and operations to conform 
to traditional life insurance business lines in a manner approved” by the Central Bank of T&T, 
including “a reconstitution of the Board of Directors, Board Committees and senior 
management” whose selection were to be approved by the government (GORTT, 2009:4).  The 
corrective measures also included the need for CLICO/CLF to fundamentally change and adopt 
a more robust and less risky business model, and to change its corporate governance structure 
(Williams, 2009).   
 
From the Commission of Enquiry into the failure of CLICO, it was further revealed that the 
Central Bank had a number of concerns about the quality of CLICO’s corporate governance, 
specifically the infrequency with which the CLICO Board met and the limited number of 
independent directors on its board (Commission of Enquiry, 2012). The board seemed to be 
simply a rubber-stamp of decisions made by the Executive Chairman. Furthermore, CLICO 
operated without an Audit Committee or Risk Committee as well as without an Investment 
Committee (Commission of Enquiry, 2012). Therefore, there was poor monitoring of decisions, 
risks, and investments. Moreover, conflicts of interest were prevalent. 
 
Discussion 
 
These three cases underscore the importance of internal and external governance practices in 
the financial sector.  Internally, it is evident that the role of management and the core 
principles of management, and the management of risk were inadequately exercised in these 
cases. Prudent leadership from the boards of directors would have ensured better monitoring 
of management’s behavior as well as adequate risk management which would, in turn, have 
protected the interests of depositors, shareholders, and other stakeholders. The directors, 
however, failed in their fiduciary duties and neglected to fulfill their roles with the duty of care 
and skills required. Therefore, whilst corporate governance frameworks existed from a 
statutory standpoint, in practice, compliance with these was highly unobserved. Further, both 
management and boards of directors in these cases may not have possessed the required 
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competency to govern their respective institutions within the complexities of the ever-evolving 
innovative financial activities.  
 
Externally, there were a number of key regulatory gaps. Regulators failed to properly supervise 
and take appropriate actions in each of the cases examined. This might be a result of a 
combination of factors such as incompetence, lack of resources, and political interference. 
Without robust supervision and timely actions, the vulnerabilities increased overtime leading 
to these crises. Arguably, the smooth functioning of financial institutions will always depend 
on the quality of oversight by regulatory bodies. In addition, the legislative framework in the 
jurisdictions in which these cases occurred did not only failed, in certain aspects, to provide 
regulators with the level of supervisory authority needed but also lagged in comparison to the 
rapidly evolving operations and complexities of financial institutions. The regulatory gaps 
together with the deficiencies among the various boards, management teams, and auditors 
clearly demonstrate the importance of good corporate governance practices for firm 
performance and sustainability. 
 
Table 2: Common Governance Problems in the Three Cases 
 
C
O
M
M
O
N
 G
O
V
E
R
N
A
N
C
E
 P
R
O
B
L
E
M
S
 
  
TRADE 
CONFIRMERS 
 
 
JAMAICA’S 
CRISIS 
 
 
CLICO/ 
CFL 
Ineffective Regulatory Oversight 
& Auditors 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Weak Legislative Frameworks ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Negligent Boards 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Interlocking Boards ✗ ✓ ✓ 
Absence of Independent Directors ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Excessive Intergroup Transactions ✗ ✓ ✓ 
Conflicts of Interest ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Poor Risk Management ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mismatches between Assets & 
Liabilities 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Inept Senior Management 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the agency theory offers valuable insights to understanding 
the behavior of managers and directors in these cases. The “model of man” underlying the 
agency theory is that of the self-interested and opportunistic agent rationally maximizing 
his/her own personal economic gain. The model is individualistic and is predicated upon the 
notion of an in-built conflict of interest between owner/principal and manager/agent. 
Moreover, the model is one of an individual calculating likely costs and benefits, and thus 
seeking to attain rewards and avoid punishment, especially financial ones (Donaldson & Davis, 
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1991).  Based on this premise, agents may commit “moral hazards” merely to enhance their 
own wealth at the cost of their principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Assuming that the 
principal and the agent are mainly concerned about maximizing their personal wealth, agency 
theory argues that the agent may not always act in the best interests of the principal as evident 
in the decisions and actions of management in three cases examined. Examples include the 
managers in Trade Confirmers who defrauded depositors, creditors, and other shareholders; or 
in the case where the financial institutions in Jamaica engaged in significantly increased risk-
taking, leading to the deterioration in the quality of loan portfolios and revealing a divergence 
of interests between managers/owners and depositors; or with the CLICO/CFL in terms of 
management using policyholders’ deposits and investing in exceedingly high levels of 
vulnerable ventures, ultimately exposing these depositors to unprecedented risks/losses. A 
major structural mechanism to curtail such managerial “opportunism” is the board of directors. 
This body provides a monitoring of managerial actions on behalf of shareholders. Such 
impartial review will occur more fully where the chairperson of the board is independent of 
executive management. Where the chief executive officer is chair of the board of directors, the 
impartiality of the board is compromised. However, in each of the cases examined, it is evident 
that the board of directors did not provide impartial oversight of management and thus failed 
to represent and protect the interests of principals. In short, in each of the cases the agents 
committed “moral hazards” as argued in the agency theory. 
 
Historically, the region’s pursuit of good corporate governance has been generally slow with 
limited pressure from government, the media, civil society, or even the professional and 
academic communities. Prior to the CLICO/CLF meltdown, the region had not experienced any 
corporate failures that had region-wide consequences as demonstrated in the cases examined. 
Thus it was reasonable to expect that in the years following the CLICO/CFL meltdown, there 
would have been pressure from various constituents for game-changing corporate governance 
reforms across the region. However, this has been relatively limited.  The CLICO/CFL 
meltdown finally prompted calls by Caribbean leaders for greater regional cooperation on 
matters of regulation and supervision of such firms. CARICOM leaders recognized the need to 
not only effect appropriate reform in financial sector policy, but also the need to enhance 
national regulatory and supervisory systems, including rationalization and consolidation of 
these systems across the region for ensuring safety, soundness, and stability in the financial 
services sector (CTIR, 2010). Furthermore, in recognizing that there is significant financial 
integration across the region based on both organic growth and mergers and acquisitions, 
cross-border supervision − according to these leaders − needs to be critically enhanced by the 
regional regulatory organizations:  the Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG), the 
Caribbean Association of Insurance Regulators (CAIR), the Caribbean Group of Securities 
Regulators (CGSR), and the Regional Competition Commission (CTIR, 2010). 
 
Although enhancing the regulatory and supervisory systems will aid in improving the quality of 
governance practices, there are doubts concerning the extent to which a positive behavioral 
change would occur among managers and directors. This is based on the observation that 
where stiffer governance regulations or laws and penalties have been enacted, a decline in 
corporate scandals did not necessarily occur. For instance, following the series of major 
corporate and accounting scandals affecting Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine 
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Systems, and WorldCom in the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was 
passed. This act established new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public company boards, 
and management and public accounting firms. As a result of SOX, top management must 
individually certify the accuracy of financial information. In addition, penalties for fraudulent 
financial activity became much more severe. SOX increased requirements for the 
independence of outside auditors who review the accuracy of corporate financial statements, 
and increased the oversight role of boards of directors (Kimmel, Weygandt, & Kieso, 2011). 
 
Yet it was primarily irresponsible governance and leadership which caused the 2008 global 
economic crisis. This underscores the inherent limitations of regulatory and compliance driven 
measures, and forces us to consider other strategies to achieve effective governance and 
leadership (Pless & Maak, 2011). SOX has neither prevented frauds nor instituted fairness, but 
it has created the perception that stricter governance laws were needed to safeguard 
investors. As a result, SOX-type regulations were subsequently enacted in other countries such 
as Canada (2002), Germany (2002), South Africa (2002), France (2003), Australia (2004), India 
(2005), Japan (2006), and Italy (2006). Nonetheless, it is still highly contentious whether a 
fundamental change in the attitude and behavior of boards and executives has not occurred. 
This suggests that strategies aimed at improving governance must give closer attention to the 
ethical dimensions of good governance.   
 
It is based on this perspective that a compliance-regulatory focus needs to be significantly 
complemented with the building of a practice of Responsible Leadership (RL). RL represents a 
concept that bridges the fields of social responsibility and leadership and can be appropriately 
applied in the study and practice of corporate governance. Although the definition of RL is 
evolving, it can be considered as intentional actions taken by leaders to benefit the 
stakeholders of the company/and or actions taken to avoid harmful consequences for 
corporate stakeholders and the larger society (Stahl & Sully de Luque, 2014:238).  RL crosses 
levels of analysis by considering individuals, groups, and organizations as a whole and 
compared to related forms of leadership such as ethical or values-based, RL has a unique 
applicability to the upper levels of organizations (Waldman & Balven 2014). This includes 
executives, and certainly the board of directors, who are charged with directing and controlling 
the decisions and behavior of the organization. Therefore, at the core of RL is the focus on how 
individual perceptions, decisions, and actions, particularly those at senior levels, impact on the 
social and financial performance of their organizations (Stahl & Sully de Luque, 2014). 
 
Responsibility is one of the core pillars of corporate governance and requires that directors 
carry out their duties with honesty, probity, and integrity (GCGF, 2008) while recognizing the 
rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements. This encourages 
cooperation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises (OECD, 2004). This core pillar has been given 
limited attention in the attempts to improve corporate governance in the region. RL not only 
addresses corporate scandals, but it extends in scope to consider the changes in and new 
demands of business contexts (Waldman & Galvin, 2008). RL therefore takes a stakeholder 
approach to governance whereby the importance of ethics and social responsibility to 
organizational effectiveness through engagement of diverse stakeholder groups accentuates 
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the duties of businesses and boards of directors beyond profitability and shareholder returns 
(Singhapakdi, Vitell, Rallapalli, & Kraft, 1996) This is in contrast to the still dominant, limited 
economic view that a business’s sole responsibility is to maximize profitability and returns to 
shareholders. While companies use the stakeholder language, their actions reflect the 
dominance of shareholder primacy in a rapidly changing world where sustainability is 
paramount.  
 
Pless and Maak (2011) maintained that RL and stakeholder approaches are not just inextricably 
linked, but RL provides a convincing perspective on how to connect leadership to stakeholder 
engagement. By making leader-stakeholder relationships the center of attention, RL focuses 
on the responsibilities that leaders have in relation to different stakeholder groups 
(shareholders, investors, regulators, customers, employees, communities, environment etc.). 
With this general demand for corporate sector involvement in socio-economic solutions, firms 
need leaders who embrace a system of decision-making that enables them to assess decisions 
in relation to relevant stakeholders. This approach should become integral to the culture and 
moral fiber of the organization and uniformly applied across its operations. It also suggests 
that even board governance has to be approached in this manner to create a RL approach to 
business. 
 
Stakeholders demand that businesses and their leaders take active roles in fostering 
responsible behavior, internally and externally to the organization, such as creating 
responsible organizational cultures, pursuing sustainability, and acting like good corporate 
citizens (Maak, 2007). The scope of RL is directly linked to the increasing attention by various 
stakeholders to the role and responsibility of business leaders in the pursuit of a global 
common good. In this context, the scope of good corporate governance changes. Neither 
boards of directors, management, or regulators should focus only on shareholder interests 
because society now demands that the interests of all key stakeholders be considered in a 
balanced manner. Profit remains critical, but the way in which it is derived becomes the key 
challenge with the new demands of and changes in business contexts. An RL approach is 
integral to responding to these contexts. 
 
This article provided insights into the state of corporate governance in the Caribbean by 
examining three major governance failures experienced in the region and proposes a 
responsible leadership approach to corporate governance because it is much more relevant to 
the changing business contexts of the region. Further research is certainly required, but the 
paper creates a framework to continue the discourse on Caribbean corporate governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Commission of Inquiry into the Causes of the Collapse of Trade Confirmers (Barbados) Ltd. (1988). 
Report of Commission of Inquiry into the Causes of the Collapse of Trade Confirmers (Barbados) Ltd., a 
Company Registered Under the Companies Act Cap. 308. 
 
Bagoo, A. (2010). Billion-dollar buddies. Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, October 3. 
 
Browne, M. (2011). Too Big to Fail: An Expensive Lesson. Paper presented at the 4th Biennial 
International Business, Banking, and Finance Conference. The Trinidad Hilton and Conference 
Centre, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, June 22-24. 
 
Center for International Private Enterprise (2008). Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets. July 31. 
 
Caribbean Community Secretariat (2006). Caribbean Trade and Investment Report 2005: Corporate 
Integration and Cross-Border Development. Georgetown: The Secretariat; Kingston: Ian Randle 
Publishers. 
 
Caribbean Community Secretariat (2010). Caribbean Trade and Investment Report 2010: Strategies for 
Recovery, Renewal and Reform. Georgetown. 
 
Commission of Enquiry into the failure of CL Financial Limited, Colonial Life Insurance Company (Trinidad) 
Limited, CLICO Investment Bank Limited, British American Insurance Company (Trinidad) Limited, 
Caribbean Money Market Brokers Limited and The Hindu Credit Union (2010-2013). 
 
Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2010). Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in 
the Age of Globalization (3rd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Donaldson, L. and Davis, J. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and 
shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16 (1): 49-65. 
 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) (2003). Report on the Caribbean Corporate Governance Forum. 
Working Paper, Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, St. Kitts.  
 
Global Corporate Governance Forum (2008). Corporate Governance Board Leadership. Washington, DC, 
International Finance Corporation. 
 
Government of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (2009). Memorandum of Understanding between 
Minister of Finance and CL Financial Limited, Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, Port of Spain, 
January 30: 1-5. 
 
Government of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (2013). Hawaii delivers Insurance Bill 2013, 
www.news.gov.tt.  
 
Green, P.M. (1999). Preserving the Integrity of the Jamaican Financial System: The Challenges. Paper 
prepared for the Central Bank Responsibility for Financial Stability Workshop. 
 
Henry, L. (2009). The CLICO Bailout: Issues, Impact and Implications for T&T and the Wider Caribbean. 
Paper presented at the Department of Economics Forum, University of the West Indies, St. 
Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago. February 12. 
 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), 305-360. 
 
18 
 
Kimmel, P. D., Weygandt, J. J., and Kieso, D. E. (2011). Financial Accounting: Tools for Business Decision 
Making, (6th ed.). United States: Wiley. 
 
Kirkpatrick, C. and Tennant, D. (2002). Responding to financial crisis: The case of Jamaica. World 
Development, 30 (11), 1933-1950. 
 
Maak, T. (2007).  Responsible leadership, stakeholder engagement and the emergence of social capital, 
Journal of Business Ethics, 74 (4): 329-343. 
 
Maier, S. (2005). How Global is Good Corporate Governance? http://www.eiris.org/files/research%20pu 
blications/howglobalisgoodcorpgov05.pdf. Ethical Investment Research Services (EIRIS): London. 
 
 
OECD (2004). Principles of Corporate Governance, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf.  
 
Oman, C., Fries, S., and Buiter, W. (2003). Corporate Governance in Developing, Transition and Emerging-
Market Economies. Policy Brief No. 23:12. Boulevard des IIles, France: OECD Development Centre. 
 
Peart, K. (1995). Financial reform and financial sector development in Jamaica. Social and Economic 
Studies, 44: 1-22. 
 
Pless, M. N. and Maak, T. (2011). Responsible leadership: Pathways to the future. Journal of Business 
Ethics, (98): 3-13 (DOI 10.1007/s10551-011-1114-4). 
 
Singhapakdi, A., Vitell, S., Rallapalli, K., and Kraft, K. (1996). The perceived role of ethics and social 
responsibility: A scale development, Journal of Business Ethics, 15 (11): 1131-1140. 
 
Soverall, W. (2012). CLICO’s corporate collapse: Poor corporate governance. American International 
Journal of Contemporary Research, 2 (2): 1-13. 
 
Soverall, W. and Persaud, W. (2013). A study of corporate failure and the political economy of financial 
regulation in Trinidad and Tobago and the Caribbean. International Journal of Humanities and Social 
Science, 3 (16): 17-28. 
 
Stahl, K. and Sully de Luque (2014). Antecedents of responsible leadership behavior: A research 
synthesis, conceptual framework, and agenda for future research. Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 28 (3), 235-254. 
 
Swaby, N. (2011). Zooming in on the ‘90s meltdown. Jamaica Gleaner. June 12. 
 
Thorpe-Taitt, J. (2004). Corruption and the role of forensic accountant: A survey of the Caribbean. 
http://sites.utoronto.ca/difa/Program/Research.html.  First acceded October 2014. 
  
Tricker, B. (2012). Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Uhrig, J. (2003). Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders. http:// 
www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/Uhrig-Report.pdf. Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra. 
 
Waldman, D. A. and Balven, R. M. (2014). Responsible leadership: Theoretical issues and research 
directions, Academy of Management Perspectives, 28 (3):  224-234. 
 
Waldman, D. A. and Galvin, B. M. (2008). Alternative perspectives of responsible leadership. 
Organizational Dynamics, 37: 327-341. 
 
Williams, E. S. (2009). Challenge of regulation in T&T Financial Sector. Barbados Business Authority, 
February 16: 9. 
 
Yin, K. R. (2014). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th ed.). Los Angeles: Sage. 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
About the Author 
 
 
Ron Sookram, PhD, holds the position of 
Director for the Centre for Corporate 
Responsibility at the Arthur Lok Jack Graduate 
School of Business (ALJGSB), University of the 
West Indies (UWI), St. Augustine Campus, 
Trinidad. He also instructs and researches topics 
in Business Ethics, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, and Corporate Governance. Prior 
to joining the ALJGSB, Ron was a Senior 
Research Specialist for Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Sustainable Development at 
the Energy Chamber of Trinidad and Tobago 
and also served as the Chair of the National 
Mirror Committee on Social Responsibility (SR) 
established by the Trinidad and Tobago Bureau 
of Standards (TTBS) to facilitate the 
development of the International Standard for 
Social Responsibility (ISO26000).  
